International Bulletin of Political
Psychology
Volume 15

Issue 8

Article 3

10-24-2003

Personnel Security and Leaking
IBPP Editor
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Other Political
Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP (2003) "Personnel Security and Leaking," International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 15
: Iss. 8 , Article 3.
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol15/iss8/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Editor: Personnel Security and Leaking

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
Title: Personnel Security and Leaking
Author: Editor
Volume: 15
Issue: 8
Date: 2003-10-24
Keywords: Leaks, Security Personnel
Abstract: The author discusses the impact of leaks on the viability of security organizations.
The sine qua non of personnel security is selecting and managing people so that they comply with
security policies, programs, rules, and laws. One main purpose of all these security activities is to
protect classified, proprietary, or otherwise sensitive information from being transmitted to adversaries,
competitors, and all others without a need to know. Yet security compliance is often ignored or
discounted through the intentional leaking of information to the mass media.
Leaking occurs for several reasons—to help advance a policy, program, rule, law, or point of view; to
help reject or impede the same; to help advance someone’s material, psychological, and even spiritual
desires; and to help reject or impede the same. The sense of entitlement that leads to the intentional
compliance violation exemplified by leaking is difficult to validate because one may be wrong in the
comparative goodness and badness of its consequences, intrinsic nature, or the intentions that set the
sense of entitlement in motion. Even more importantly, the leaking necessarily weakens the very
cohesive and centripetal dynamics that support security compliance of all people in an organization
expected to be compliant.
A senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (Frye, 2003) has suggested that leaks elicited by a
mass media representative often serve the public interest, while leaks initiated by “self-serving
antagonists in the political process….rarely serve the public interest.” In actuality, both are serving their
respective selves and both are weakening personnel security regardless of other consequences. When
all in an organization know that all may be leaking as well as wrongly transmitting information to
adversaries, competitors, and all others without a need to know, a viable personnel security program
becomes but a chimera. Save for carefully thought out disinformation and misinformation initiatives, as
well as just blind luck, the security challenge becomes that much greater. (See Frye, A. (October 22,
2003.) Let someone else do the talking. The New York Times, p. A27; Gerrad, J. (2002). A sense of
entitlement: Vicissitudes of working with "special' patients. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 19, 173188; Mullen, P.E. (2002). Moral principles don't signify. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 9, 19-21;
Witte, T. H., Callahan, K. L., & Perez-Lopez, M. (2002). Narcissism and anger: An exploration of
underlying correlates. Psychological Reports, 90, 871-875.)
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